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Those who venture into the restitution thicket not infrequently become lost. 
It is part of our task to see that they are heard from again.
1
 
Introduction 
1. One distinctive feature of the common law system is its duality. No legal analysis is complete 
without considering both the rules of common law and the principles of equity. Civilians 
(non-lawyers in common law countries and lawyers from civil law countries) struggle to 
understand why there are two systems of justice in the legal discourse and how they interact 
with one another. The trite proposition that equity prevails whenever there is a conflict belies 
the complexity of the relationship. The other distinctive feature is that much of the law 
continues to be made in the courts rather than by legislation. Judge-made law derives 
empirically from cases, from which principles are then deduced, and not the other way 
around. The development of any new subject in the law is almost always a slow and tortuous 
process. The law of restitution is a relatively new subject, and its boundaries and content are 
still controversial. One of the enduring controversies is the place of the equitable liability in 
knowing receipt within the law of restitution. Recent decisions in the Commonwealth have 
shown how the boundaries may be redrawn. 
Restitution 
Restitution to Reverse Unjust Enrichment 
2. Academics in the law of restitution draw the boundaries of the law of restitution in different 
places. Restitution is a remedy, and it is important to understand what it is the cause of action. 
The modern meaning of restitution focuses on the remedy to reverse the unjust enrichment of 
                                                 
*
 This lecture series, and the professorship at the SMU School of Law, were made possible by a very generous 
donation from the Yong Shook Lin Trust. For more information on the lecture series, see: 
http://www.law.smu.edu.sg/yphdls/20110519/lectureseries.asp. 
1
 Levin J in Snider v Dunn 160 NW 2d 619, 628 (1968, Michigan Court of Appeal). Cited in “Understanding the 
Law of Restitution: a Map through the Thicket” in A Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obligations (1998) at 
45. 
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the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. The core example is the common law claim for 
money had and received. It is a monetary claim to reverse the unjustified flow of wealth from 
the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant is strictly liable for the value of the enrichment 
received, subject to defences like bona fide purchase and bona fide change of position. This is 
the law of unjust enrichment. The defendant’s duty to make restitution is correlative to the 
plaintiff’s right based on the principle against unjust enrichment.2  
Restitution for Wrongs 
3. Restitution is also a remedy to transfer to the plaintiff the gain that the defendant has made by 
the commission of a wrong against the plaintiff. There is no flow of wealth from the plaintiff 
to the defendant as such. The core examples in the law are the common law claims in waiver 
of tort,
3
 and the account of profits claim in equity.
4
 This is still discussed in most textbooks 
on the law of restitution. Restitution in this sense is often referred to as “disgorgement”5 to 
distinguish it from restitution for unjust enrichment. The defendant’s duty to make restitution 
in this case arises from the wrong committed against the plaintiff.  
“Restitution” and Compensation6 
4. There are two other types of personal remedies where “restitution” may be used in the law to 
signify concepts of loss especially in the context of trusts and equity and much to the dismay 
of unjust enrichment lawyers. Care must be taken to distinguish them from the senses above. 
Restitution is sometimes used to mean the restoration of a fund to its state before a breach of 
duty.
7
 The classic example is the duty of an express trustee to preserve the property of a trust. 
Restitution in this context refers to the reconstitution or restoration of the trust fund by 
returning any property taken out of the trust in breach, or the money equivalent thereof. 
Generally, a trustee (at least of a traditional trust) comes under a duty to make to restitution to 
reconstitute the trust fund in the event of a breach.
8
 There is no question of causation, 
                                                 
2
 Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548; Seagate Technology Pte Ltd v Goh Han Kim [1995] 1 
SLR 17 (CA). 
3
 United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1. 
4
 One controversial example is the account of profits claim for breach of contract: AG v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268; 
Teh Guek Ngor Engelin v Chia Ee Lin Evelyn [2005] 3 SLR 22 (CA). 
5
 L Smith, “The Province of the Law of Restitution” (1992) 71 Can Bar Rev 672. 
6
 See generally, J Edelman and S Elliott, “Money remedies against trustees” (2004) 18 TLI 116, S Elliott and C 
Mitchell, “Remedies for Dishonest Assistance” (2004) 67 MLR 16. 
7
 Ex p Adamson (1878) 8 Ch App 807 at 819. See also Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns (A Firm) [1996] 1 AC 
421. 
8
 The extent to which this principle applies to commercial trusts is controversial. Compare Target Holdings Ltd 
v Redferns (A Firm) [1996] 1 AC 421 with Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 
484, [2003] HCA 15. 
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remoteness, or mitigation involved; the trustee is called upon to perform its duty to the trust. 
Where the value of the property has remained constant, the loss suffered will coincide with 
the gain received by the defendant, but the basis of the measure is the loss.  
5. Finally, restitution is used in the sense of monetary compensation to repair the damage 
suffered by the plaintiff. The purpose of this reparative measure is to put the plaintiff in the 
position as if the defendant’s breach had not occurred. The critical question is what the 
position the plaintiff would have been but for the breach of duty. In this sense “restitution” is 
virtually indistinguishable from “compensation” as understood in the common law. However, 
the extent to which equitable compensation is measured differently from common law 
damages remains controversial, and the nature of the equitable duty is likely to make a 
difference.
9
 In any event, while this measure may overlap with the restorative sense of 
restitution above, it is broader because it may include consequential losses, eg, the loss of a 
business opportunity as a result of the deprivation of property. The terminology is not stable, 
and equitable compensation is used to refer to both the restorative and reparative measures of 
loss.
10
 “Restitution” should be avoided in these contexts in the interest of clarity. 
Restitution and Property 
6. There are two further senses in which “restitution” is used, but to refer to proprietary 
remedies. These fall outside the scope of this paper.
11
  
Knowing Receipt and Knowing Assistance 
                                                 
9
 See eg, Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1; J Edelman and S Elliot, “Money remedies 
against trustees” (2004) 18 TLI 116. 
10
 It has been said that the “restitutionary” character (putting the plaintiff in the position before the wrong 
occurred) of equitable compensation has been used to distinguish it from common law damages (putting the 
plaintiff in the position as if the wrong had not occurred): Swindle v Harrison [1997] 4 All ER 705 (CA). But 
the distinction drawn is really between the restorative and reparative measures, both of which “equitable 
compensation” has been used in the case law to describe. 
11
 First, restitution is also used to refer to a claim by the plaintiff that the defendant holds property on a 
constructive trust for the plaintiff, ie, proprietary restitution. It is a matter of controversy when the proprietary 
remedies are available in addition to the personal remedies mentioned above, and many have argued that this is 
really the subject of property law. For example, the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) in Sinclair 
Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 347 refused to follow the proposition 
in A-G v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 that a fiduciary holds bribes on constructive trust for his principal on the basis 
that it was bound by its own previous decisions (including Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1), thus putting 
Singapore law at variance (Kartika Ratna Thahir v PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara 
(Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR 257 (CA)). Secondly, specific restitution is an order that the defendant should return 
the plaintiff’s property in the defendant’s possession to the plaintiff. This is a relatively uncontroversial area, 
and the order is usually made to support a common law claim for wrongful detention of property because the 
common law only awards damages.  
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7. Any attempt to understand the law on knowing receipt must start with the classic statement of 
Lord Chancellor Selborne in Barnes v Addy.
12
  
.. strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the 
agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of 
which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become 
chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in 
a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. 
The two italicised parts of the passage came to be recognised as references to liability for 
“knowing receipt” and “knowing assistance” respectively in subsequent case law and 
textbooks.  
Liability for Assistance 
8. The law on knowing assistance has been more or less rationalised in a series of cases, and 
today, it is generally recognised that the liability is based on the defendant’s wrong of 
dishonestly assisting in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty; it is generally referred to as 
“dishonest assistance” today.13 The test of dishonesty in Singapore law is an objective one: 
the defendant is liable if he has “such knowledge of the irregular shortcomings of the 
transaction that ordinary honest people would consider it to be a breach of standards of 
honest conduct if he failed to adequately query them”.14 It is a type of civil secondary liability, 
and the defendant is jointly and severally liable with the trustee or fiduciary in breach. The 
defendant is a “constructive trustee” only in the sense that his liability is equated to that of the 
defaulting trustee. The defendant never was a trustee in any sense of holding property on trust.  
Liability for Receipt 
Compensation within Trusts Law 
                                                 
12
 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 at 251-252. 
13
 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC, Brunei); Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 
[2002] UKHL 12; Barlow Clowes Internatinoal Ltd (in liq) v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1476, 
[2005] UKPC 37; George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 (CA). Contra Farah 
Construction Pty Ltd v. Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89 where the Australian High Court 
declined to follow the post-Barnes v Addy developments elsewhere. The result is that the requirement that the 
breach of trust be dishonest (dispensed with in English and Singapore law) still remains in Australian law, and 
the standard of liability may not be the same as that in English or Singapore law. 
14
 George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 (CA) at [22]. 
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9. Liability for “knowing receipt” is the more difficult case. It is widely accepted that the 
elements of the claim are correctly stated by Hoffmann LJ in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings 
plc:
15
  
This is a claim to enforce a constructive trust on the basis of knowing receipt. For this 
purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary 
duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as 
representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the 
defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty. 
10. Debate has been raging for many years as to the standard of liability. Constructive notice was 
the prevalent view in the 1960’s and 1970’s when this type of liability came into 
prominence.
16
 The test then shifted to knowledge,
17
 and then from 2000,
18
 the English courts 
accepted that the test for liability was such knowledge of the circumstances of the breach that 
made it unconscionable for the defendant to retain the benefit of the receipt. This test has 
been endorsed recently by the highest courts in Singapore (George Raymond Zage III v Ho 
Chi Kwong)
19
 and Hong Kong SAR (Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) (aka 
Kasikornbank Public Co Ltd) v Akai Holdings Ltd (in liquidation)).
20
 Actual knowledge of 
the breach, or of suspicious or unusual circumstances which are not followed up by inquiries, 
can found liability.
21
 “Unconscionable receipt” has become the new label for this head of 
liability, although it is not very informative since unconscionability is the threshold to invoke 
equitable jurisdiction in every case, and it bears different meanings in different contexts. If 
the Hong Kong case turns out to be influential, however, it may well be renamed “irrational 
receipt”, though in substance there may not be any difference.  
11. It is a matter of some debate what the basis of this liability is. On a traditional trusts analysis 
the liability for knowing receipt could be explained on the basis of a trustee’s duty to preserve 
the property of the trust.
22
 Generally, this personal duty to account needs to be invoked only 
if the property has been dissipated. The personal liability to account as a constructive trustee 
arises because the defendant had become a constructive trustee of the property received by 
                                                 
15
 [1994] 2 All ER 685 (CA) at 700. 
16
 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch 276. 
17
 Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264; Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Star plc [1992] 4 All 
ER 700, at 760; Eagle Trust plc v SBC Securities Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 484 at 504. 
18
 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, [2000] EWCA Civ 
502. 
19
 [2010] 2 SLR 589 (CA). See also Yogambikai Nagarajah v Indian Overseas Bank [1997] 1 SLR 258 C(A). 
20
 [2010] HKCFA 63, (HKCFA, 8 November 2010). 
21
 George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 (CA). 
22
 P Jaffey, “The nature of knowing receipt” (2001) 15 TLI 151; S Gardner, “Moment of Truth for Knowing 
Receipt” (2009) 125 LQR 20. 
6 
 
virtue of his legal title in the property coupled with sufficient knowledge of the circumstances 
of the breach of trust. Where a defendant has received property traceable to a breach of 
trust,
23
 then unless he is a bona fide purchaser of the legal interest for value without notice, he 
does not obtain the beneficial interest, and the beneficiary of the trust may maintain a 
proprietary claim for the return of the property. This is a straight priorities of title fight, and 
the state of the defendant’s knowledge is only relevant in the context of the bona fide 
purchaser defence. Once the defendant is fixed with sufficient knowledge of the 
circumstances of the breach, he becomes a constructive trustee and the obligations of a 
constructive trustee are imposed on him.
24
 However, the obligations of constructive trustees 
are not necessarily the same as those of express trustees. Unlike express trusteeship which is 
voluntarily assumed, constructive trusteeship is imposed by the law. In this context, the 
courts have sought to impose a higher threshold for the personal liability to account for the 
dissipated trust property.
25
 On this analysis, the personal liability to account is derived from a 
real trust relationship (albeit imposed by the law), and it is accurate to call the defendant a 
constructive trustee. He may have disposed of the trust property, but his obligation as such a 
trustee subsists. As a matter of principle, such liability can only arise if the defendant has 
sufficient knowledge that he is dealing with trust property. 
12. Alternatively, equitable liability could be founded on the basis of interference with property 
interests without reference to the constructive trust over property. For example, equitable 
liability for dishonest assistance is founded on the interference with a trust or fiduciary 
institution without the defendant touching any trust property. Similarly, inconsistent dealing 
by a person who is not a constructive trustee (eg, lawful but ministerial receipt of property by 
an agent) may also give rise equitable liability to compensate for loss to a trust.. Traditionally, 
however, knowing receipt has been treated differently.
26
 
13. On either view, the remedy for the breach would be equitable compensation. It probably 
encompasses both the restorative measure of reconstituting the trust fund and the reparative 
                                                 
23
 In the case of property not the subject of trust by protected by a fiduciary institution, the property may be 
impressed by a constructive at the time of receipt by virtue of the breach of fiduciary duty, thus satisfying the 
requirement for receipt of property subject to a (constructive) trust. But this argument cannot be pressed too far 
– it cannot apply if a constructive trust is sought to be imposed on the property which was never held by either 
the fiduciary or the principle and is not a traceable proceed thereof: Farah Construction Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty 
Ltd [2007] HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89. 
24
 Westdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 707. 
25
 Re Montague’s Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264. 
26
 J Mowbray, L Tucker, N Le Poidevin, E Simpson and J Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (18
th
 ed, 2008) at [42.03] 
and [42.83]-[42.97]. 
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measure for the losses arising from the dissipation of the property. The general assumption 
has been that because it is a receipt-based liability, the defendant’s liability is for the value 
received if he had the requisite knowledge at that time.
27
 This is consistent with the view that 
the duty is one to reconstitute the trust as the constructive trust came into existence at the 
point of receipt, or alternatively that the receipt itself was the wrongful conduct to base 
accessory liability. 
Restitution: A Right in Unjust Enrichment Law 
14. The view that the liability is receipt-based28 has also spawned many arguments based on 
unjust enrichment. The law of the unjust enrichment generally imposes liability when (a) the 
defendant has been enriched; (b) at the expense of the plaintiff; (c) where the enrichment is 
unjust; and (d) there are no applicable defences. The late Professor Peter Birks was the main 
proponent of the view that liability in knowing receipt should be explained on the basis of 
these principles of unjust enrichment and thus liability should be strict.
29
 Subsequently, he 
changed tack and supported the extra-judicial argument of Lord Nicholls
30
 that knowing 
receipt was based on a wrong, but there is an alternative liability which can be made out on 
the principles of unjust enrichment.
31
 Lord Millett was another proponent of the unjust 
enrichment analysis.
32
 Unjust enrichment analysis imposes strict liability for the value 
received subject to restitutionary defences (in particular, bona fide purchase and the change 
of position).  
15. If the property or its traceable product remains in the hands of the defendant, a proprietary 
claim may be made. The issue of personal liability usually arises only if the property has been 
                                                 
27
 C Harpum, “The Basis of Equitable Liability” in P Birks (ed), The Frontiers of Liability (1994) Vol 1, 9 at 19. 
28
 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC, Brunei) at 386; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v 
Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913, [2002] UKHL 48, at [87]; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 [2002] 
UKHL 12 at [105]. See also Tang Hsiu Lan v Pua Ai Seok [2000] SGHC 163 at [12]. 
29
 See, eg, P Birks, “Trusts in the Recovery of Misapplied Assets: Tracing, Trusts, and Restitution” in E 
McKendrick, “Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations” (1992) 149.  
30
 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in WR Cornish, R Nolan, J 
O’Sullivan, G Virgo (eds), Restitution, Past, Present and Future : Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (1998) 231. 
See also Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC, Brunei) at 386. 
31
 Birks, “Receipt”, in Birks and Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (2002); P Birks, “Knowing Receipt: Re Montagu’s 
Settlement Trusts Revisited” (2001) 1 Global Jurist Advances Article 2; P Birks, ‘The Role of Fault in the Law 
of Unjust Enrichment' in GH Jones and WJ Swadling (eds) The Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord 
Goff of Chieveley (1999) 235. 
32
 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913, [2002] UKHL 48, at [87]; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley 
[2002] 2 AC 164 [2002] UKHL 12 at [105]. 
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dissipated.
33
 In practical terms, this leads to two key differences between strict and fault 
lliability: (a) if the defendant is a purchaser who has been unable to invoke the bona fide 
purchase defence,
34
 unjust enrichment analysis throws the burden on the defendant to prove 
lack of the requisite knowledge to invoke the change of position defence
35
 while trusts law 
requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of the requisite knowledge for liability; and (b) if 
the defendant is a volunteer, unjust enrichment imposes liability subject to the defendant 
proving change of position, while trusts analysis only imposes liability if the plaintiff can 
show that the defendant has the requisite knowledge. The first effectively comes down to a 
difference in the burden of proof. The second problem may be ameliorated by more liberal 
rules of tracing as to allow greater scope for the strict liability proprietary claim against the 
volunteer, but will lead to greater incidence of proprietary claims generally. 
16. It is impossible to do justice to the doctrinal arguments for and against the unjust enrichment 
analysis within the confines of this paper. In any event, courts have generally not been very 
sympathetic to it for two reasons. Because of a policy concern for the potential hindrance of 
commercial transactions, they have been reluctant to adopt the alternative unjust enrichment 
analysis because there are no direct judicial authorities in support.
36
  
From Restitution to Compensation for a Wrong 
17. Clear support for the view that knowing receipt liability is based on the wrongful conduct of 
the defendant comes from the English Court of Appeal in Charter Plc v City Index Ltd.
37
 The 
issue arose whether a defendant found liable in knowing receipt could seek contribution from 
other parties. That question turned on whether the defendant’s liability was “compensation” 
                                                 
33
 There may be an incentive to make a personal liability claim if the property has decreased in value since 
receipt. On this, see Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) (aka Kasikornbank Public Co Ltd) v Akai 
Holdings Ltd (in liquidation) [2010] HKCFA 63, (HKCFA, 8 November 2010), discussed below at [23]. 
34
 On the trusts analysis, bona fide purchase of legal interest for value without notice shields the defendant from 
the jurisdiction of equity, so it neither proprietary nor personal claims can be sustained. Bona fide purchase is 
also a defence to a personal restitutionary claim.  
35
 The test of bona fide conduct in the change of position defence is very similar to if not the same as the test of 
unconscionability in knowing receipt. 
36
 Rejected in England (Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, 
[2000] EWCA Civ 502), Hong Kong SAR (Akai Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat 
(Mahachon) (aka Kasikornbank Public Ltd Co [2008] HKCU 810) and Australia (Farah Construction Pty Ltd v 
Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89). In Singapore, the Court of Appeal has categorically 
rejected strict liability for knowing receipt (George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 (CA)). 
Although it did not expressly reject the possibility of an claim in unjust enrichment that is alternative to the 
claim in knowing receipt, it had referred to Lord Nicholls’ extra-judicial argument on this point, and the concern 
of the court with the expectations of commercial parties suggests that it would not have accepted this argument 
if it had been made. 
37
 [2008] Ch 325 (CA), [2007] EWCA Civ 1382. 
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in respect of “damage” under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.38 Carnworth and 
Mummery LJJ rejected receipt as the basis of liability.
39
 Instead, liability arose because of 
retention and disposition of the property with sufficient knowledge that the property was trust 
property.
40
 This is consistent with the analysis above that the personal liability arose from a 
real constructive trust over property. The most important proposition to emerge from this case 
is that the remedy for knowing receipt is to make good the loss of the claimants; it is a claim 
for equitable compensation. Arden LJ went further, and alluded to an alternative claim for 
account of profits based on the wrong of knowing receipt.  
Similarity to Dishonest Assistance 
18. The authorities so far have marginalised the unjust enrichment arguments, and what is 
emerging are the propositions that (a) a claim in knowing receipt is based on the wrongful 
conduct of the defendant; (b) the standard of liability is pegged to the possession of such 
knowledge of the circumstances of the breach of trust that would render the defendant’s 
retention of the property unconscionable; and (c) the remedy is to compensate the beneficiary 
for losses suffered; (d) there may be a possible further remedy of account of profits. It is 
important to notice the similarities that this bears to the claim in dishonest assistance: (a) it is 
based on the wrongful conduct of the defendant; (b) the standard of liability is pegged to the 
possession of such knowledge of the circumstances of the breach of trust that would render 
the conduct of the defendant dishonest; and (c) the remedy is to compensate the beneficiary 
for losses suffered; and (d) there may be a possible further remedy of account of profits. 
However, the similarities are only superficial. There is a fundamental difference in the type of 
wrong committed. In dishonest assistance, the wrong is in rendering aid to the trustee in the 
breach, and the liability is pegged to the liability of the trustee, in respect of the losses caused 
by the breach by the primary trustee. In knowing receipt, the wrong is committed only in 
respect of the property received; the liability is in respect of the defendant’s own breach of 
duty as trustee, not the primary trustee’s breach of duty. There may however be overlapping 
claims on the facts. But passive receipt in itself cannot be the basis of a claim in dishonest 
assistance, as recognised by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Zage III.
41
 
Equitable Compensation 
                                                 
38
 Sections 1(1) and 1(6), in pari materia with the Civil Law Act (Cap 33A, 2007 Ed), sections 15(1) and 15(6). 
39
 Note 37, at [8] and [32] (Carnworth LJ. Mummery LJ agreed). 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 [2010] 2 SLR 589 (CA) at [43]. 
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19. It is not surprising that comparisons have been made between knowing receipt liability and 
the tort of conversion at common law.
42
 They are similar in the sense that the basic rationale 
for the claim is the protection of the plaintiff’s interest in property from interference by the 
defendant. This comparison was taken to a new height in the Hong Kong Court of Final 
Appeal decision in Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) (ala Kasikornbank 
Public Co Ltd) v Akai Holdings Ltd (in liq) (the “Thai Farmers Bank” case).43 To simplify the 
facts, a director of P had, in breach of fiduciary and lacking P’s authority, pledged certain 
shares certificates belonging to P to D as security for a loan. P claimed against D in knowing 
receipt. The Court of First Instance denied the claim, but the Court of Appeal allowed the 
claim for HK$20m which was price D obtained upon selling the share certificates. On appeal 
to the HKCFA, the key issue was whether the director had ostensible authority at the time of 
the pledge agreement to enter into the agreement. The HKCFA (Lord Neuberger NPJ 
delivering the only reasoned judgment) held that D could not rely on ostensible authority 
because its conduct, although not dishonest, had fallen below the standard of rationality 
(which was a standard slightly less demanding than the standard of reasonableness) expected 
of a party in that situation.
44
 This meant that the agreement was void for want of authority, no 
interest in the share certificates passed to D, and P had sufficient legal interest to maintain an 
action in the tort of conversion, and was entitled to HK$20m being the proceeds of the sale 
which was clearly an act of conversion by D. This tort claim emerged only in the HKCFA 
decision. The court went on to consider whether D was also liable in knowing receipt. The 
shares were roughly valued at HK$50m at the time of the pledge, HK$32m at the time the 
loan defaulted, HK$20m at the time D sold the shares, and were worthless by the time of trial. 
The strategic reason for P pressing the knowing receipt claim was to argue that it was entitled 
to either HK$50m (value at the time received) or HK$32m (value at the time D ought to have 
sold the shares).  
20. The court assumed (based on the parties’ concession) that the test for liability in knowing 
receipt is unconscionability.
45
 It did not deal with the strict liability argument because it 
found unconscionability on the facts. It also assumed that where a plaintiff had concurrent 
claims in the tort of conversion and in knowing receipt, it had the freedom to choose which 
                                                 
42
 See, eg, L Smith, “W(h)ither Knowing Receipt” (1998) 114 LQR 394; P Jaffey, “The nature of knowing 
receipt” (2001) 15 TLI 151; P Birks, “The Role of Fault in the Law of Unjust Enrichment” in W Swadling and 
G Jones (eds), The Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (1999) at 269. 
43
 [2010] HKCFA 63, (HKCFA, 8 November 2010). 
44
 Because the reasoning was based on general estoppel principles, this could have wider implications for the 
law of estoppel beyond agency law. 
45
 [2010] HKCFA 63 at [128]. 
11 
 
claim it wishes to proceed on (this point was also unchallenged). The court observed that 
equitable compensation for knowing receipt may not be assessed in the same way as common 
law damages, though it also warned against overstating the differences. There are three points 
of interest to the law of knowing receipt.  
21. First, In respect of the standard of liability, the court held that, at least in a commercial 
context, the same standard of conduct applied to the question whether the defendant could 
rely on the ostensible authority of the director and the question whether it was liable for 
knowing receipt, absent any special facts.
46
 In other words, in general, irrationality in relying 
on an agent’s authority (a common law standard) refers to the same standard as 
unconscionability in the receipt or retention of property traceable to a breach of trust. This 
convergence of standards has an advantage of making it easier for parties to assess risks in 
commercial transactions.  
22. Secondly, the court suggested that a broad view may be taken of the element of “benefit” 
received by D. D had argued that P remained the absolute owner of the share certificates as a 
result of the void contract; there was no beneficial receipt. The court had two answers. First, 
D became legal owner of the proceeds of the sale.
47
 This must be understood in the context of 
the facts: given the antecedent breach of fiduciary duty, P could trace its property in the share 
certificates to the sale proceeds and assert a constructive trust over such proceeds.
48
 Secondly, 
and more controversially, the court suggested that it is arguable (without actually considering 
the point) that when D purported to exercise its power of sale under the agreement, it had 
sufficient control over the shares to amount to beneficial receipt.
49
 With respect, as the 
contract was void and there was therefore no pledge, it seems neither here nor there that the 
bank was exercising a non-existent right. Even though knowing receipt is based on wrongful 
interference and not the reversal of unjust enrichment, “beneficial receipt” still makes sense 
on the analysis that the personal liability springs from an actual constructive trust of property. 
However, it makes less sense if one were to look at it simply as an equitable wrong of 
interference with property.
50
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23. What was not answered was the question whether a knowing receipt claim could be made 
against a defendant receiving an item of property in which the plaintiff had remained the 
absolute owner. This would have been essential to the argument that the knowing receipt 
claim arose on the date of receipt of the share certificates. This is analogous to the problem of 
the thief and (proprietary) constructive trusts. Elsewhere, Lord Browne-Wilkinson had 
suggested that even though the theft victim remained the absolute owner a thief could become 
a constructive trustee even though there was no legal or equitable title vested in the trustee.
51
 
This is in the nature of a remedial constructive trust imposed to create the equity for 
intervention. Such an extraordinary step should be taken, if at all, only if it is clear that legal 
remedies are manifestly inadequate. An analogous difficulty also arises if the plaintiff had 
chosen to sue in unjust enrichment on the basis of benefits conferred under a void contract. 
This would have been an advantageous course of action because the claim is based on strict 
liability for the value received subject to change to position (which the bank would not have 
been able to make out on account of its unconscionable or irrational conduct).
52
 However, the 
question is whether a defendant is enriched by the receipt of property of which the plaintiff 
remains the absolute owner has not been answered by the common law.  
24. Thirdly, and this is probably the most intriguing aspect of this decision, it discusses the 
quantum of liability for knowing receipt, a point that is rarely subjected to judicial or 
academic attention. Because the liability is cast as one for equitable compensation, the focus 
is on what loss has been suffered by the plaintiff. Significantly, the court, citing Target 
Holdings Limited v. Redferns,
53
 focussed on the need to establish that the loss would not have 
occurred but for the breach of duty by the defendant.
54
 The court held that in the 
circumstances, the quantum of equitable compensation should be fixed at the date the bank 
sold the shares, even if the liability for knowing receipt arose some 18 months earlier on the 
date of receipt.
55
 Significantly, the court noted that the on the uncontested evidence, P would 
have held on to the shares if they had been returned, until they became worthless, and that P 
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was in fact better off as a result of D’s breach of duty.56 So strong was the judicial desire to 
arrive at the same quantum at common law and in equity that the court observed that it would 
have been prepared to refashion the equitable rules had a different conclusion been reached.
57
  
25. If the equitable compensation is intended to restore a fund to its state before the breach, and 
the constructive trust arose at the time of receipt, then the court appeared to have awarded too 
little. If the equitable compensation is intended to repair the actual losses suffered by P, then 
P could not point to any loss suffered but for the breach by D in failing to return the share 
certificates. After all, Target Holdings held that equitable compensation should be assessed at 
the date of trial with the full benefit of hindsight.
58
 The clue lies in another part of the 
judgment discussing P’s entitlement to interest, where the court noted that D had no duty to 
preserve the value of the property.
59
 Thus, it is suggested that the measure of equitable 
compensation awarded in the case was in fact the restorative measure, but the value of the 
property was fixed at the time of the sale. Under the restorative measure, considerations of 
causation, remoteness and mitigation are irrelevant in the assessment; the only question is the 
valuation of the property. On the other hand, had consequential losses additionally been 
claimed, these losses would have been subjected to the tests of causation, remoteness and 
mitigation. 
The Conversion Analogy 
26. So far, we have seen the judicial rejection of, or at least the lack of enthusiasm for, the unjust 
enrichment analysis of the typical situation where unjust enrichment applies. What appears 
instead is the fault-based liability which arises because of the retention and inconsistent 
dealing with property. The alignment of the measure of loss with the tort of conversion 
presses the conversion analogy even further: the restorative measure in equity to reinstate the 
trust fund corresponds to the damages vindicating the property rights of the plaintiff in the 
tort of conversion. 
27. One must approach any legal analogy with caution. The modern common law has a single 
system of property law comprising legal and equitable interests; there are not two systems of 
property laws.
60
 Nevertheless, different incidents may flow from legal or equitable property 
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interests for historical and structural reasons. Judicial development of the law is necessarily 
constrained by doctrines and judicial precedents. On the other hand, the desire not to have 
different outcomes in common law and equity is not simply an academic aspiration. The law 
should be as rational and simple as possible. 
28. Moreover, conversion is not an example of the common law at its lucid best. The tort of 
conversion serves three different functions in the law within a single set of liability rules.
61
 It 
is thus not surprising that it difficult to rationalise the rules internally. First, for want of 
another tool, conversion serves to protect the plaintiff’s property rights at law. Secondly, as a 
tort it seeks to compensate the plaintiff for losses due to wrongful conduct of the defendant. 
Thirdly, it also strives to prevent the defendant from being unjustly enriched. Thus, strict 
liability is imposed on those who detain or deal inconsistently the plaintiff’s property because 
the common law has no means of ordering the return of property. To reconcile with its role of 
property protection, “wrong” in this context is defined by the voluntary interference with the 
plaintiff’s property right rather than any blameworthy conduct as such. The “loss” is, unlike 
the rest of tort law, not measured strictly terms of putting the plaintiff in the position as if the 
tort had not occurred, but also takes into account the loss of value in property, in vindication 
of property rights. The latter type of loss (like the restorative measure in equity) is not subject 
to any consideration of causation, remoteness or mitigation rules. Savings in expenditure and 
profits made from converted property may also be claimed, either as part of the loss (use 
value of property) or as account of profits. Lord Nicholls suggested splitting up the law of 
conversion such that the restitutionary aspect of the claim can remain based on strict liability 
(on the basis of property protection and unjust enrichment principles), but that the liability for 
losses should be based on fault, possibly dishonesty.
62
 He noted the particular hardship that 
strict liability in the tort of conversion may cause the defendant who no longer possesses the 
goods.
63
 From this perspective, it appears that equity has performed better, in differentiating 
between proprietary and personal accountability claims.  
Defences 
29. If the basis of liability for knowing receipt lies in the law of wrongs and not unjust 
enrichment, then it follows that the change of position defence, which is exclusive to the law 
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of unjust enrichment, does not apply. In any event, given the convergence of the standard for 
disapplying the change of position defence and the standard of liability for knowing receipt,
64
 
the establishment of liability would practically rule out the defence anyway.
65
 
30. It has generally been assumed that a claim in knowing receipt would be characterised as 
restitutionary for choice of law purposes and be subject to the choice of law rules for 
restitution,
66
 but this was at a time when the “receipt-based” liability view held sway in 
English law. In general, the proper law of a restitutionary obligation is determined in the 
following manner: (a) if the obligation arises in connection with immovable property, the 
proper law of the restitutionary obligation is the lex situs; (b) if the obligation arises in 
connection with a contract, the proper law of the restitutionary obligation is the proper law of 
the contract; and (c) in other cases, the proper law of the restitutionary obligation is the law of 
the place of enrichment.
67
 Now that “receipt-based” liability has given way to wrongful 
retention of or inconsistent dealing with property as the foundation of liability, the relevant 
choice of law rule requires reconsideration. After all, claims in conversion are subject to tort 
choice of law rules. Where an equitable duty arises from a factual matrix where the 
relationship between the parties is essentially tortious, this requires the application of torts 
choice of law rules, ie double actionability (actionability under the law of the forum as if the 
wrong had been committed in the forum, and civil liability under law of the place where the 
wrong was committed) subject to a flexible exception.
68
 Most of these cases attract the place 
of enrichment rule anyway if characterised as restitutionary, and this is usually also the place 
of the tort if so characterised (the wrongful detention).
69
 However, the law of the forum limb 
could make a difference in some cases. 
Conclusion 
31. If we decide that knowing receipt is indeed a wrong we should take the logical steps to 
rationalise it as such. The developments in Charter Plc v City Index in England and the 
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Thanakharn case in Hong Kong represent incremental steps in this direction. Although the 
Singapore courts have not gone to the same extent, these developments are highly relevant 
for the courts to consider how they want to develop Singapore law.  
32. These steps taken in England and Hong Kong SAR explicitly carve out the law on knowing 
receipt from the law of restitution to the extent that the latter means the law of unjust 
enrichment. By explicitly recognising the remedy as equitable compensation, it places 
knowing receipt clearly in the law of equity and trusts, or from a different classification 
perspective, the law of wrongs. This has implications beyond the debate on the standard of 
liability. On this basis, liability is measured by the loss to the plaintiff, but this includes loss 
in the value of property taken from the trust. Change of position is an irrelevant defence both 
in theory and practice. Causation, remoteness and mitigation are not relevant when it comes 
to the restorative measure of compensation, but may be relevant in respect of consequential 
losses. However, the value of the property to be restored must still be assessed, and this is not 
necessarily the value of the property at the time of receipt. Further, the assumption that the 
choice of law rules for restitution applies to claims in knowing receipt will need to be 
reconsidered. Finally, the analogy with the tort of conversion needs to be approached with 
some caution. 
33. Whether there is an alternative cause of action in unjust enrichment based on the receipt of 
equitable property (or perhaps property otherwise subject to a fiduciary institution) is a 
different question. It has been rejected by the Australian High Court, the Hong Court of First 
Instance and the English Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court in the UK has yet to 
consider the question. It appears to have been rejected implicitly by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal, but it is not clear whether counsel had pressed the argument. On the whole the 
judicial acceptance of this line of argument looks increasingly unlikely. 
 
